tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2973234823160864227.post5692434853295008691..comments2008-04-02T19:49:56.881-07:00Jackhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09996249282677363041noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2973234823160864227.post-61149136104062283862008-04-02T19:49:00.000-07:002008-04-02T19:49:00.000-07:00I think you need to provide a definition for what you mean by "to know"!!<BR/><BR/>Reading about <A HREF="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology" REL="nofollow">Epistemology</A> in wikipedia, knowledge is a <A HREF="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Classical-Definition-of-Kno.svg" REL="nofollow">subset of truth and beliefs</A>.<BR/><BR/>In this definition, we cannot say the we know its Zebra, unless it is assumed to be a Zebra! I don't see the problem you describe according to that definition...Devil's Mindhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10541884626112839842noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2973234823160864227.post-91455200507677493912008-03-22T18:41:00.000-07:002008-03-22T18:41:00.000-07:00"<I>To know that you know, it seems, you have to know that the relevant alternatives do not obtain.</I>"<BR/><BR/>Isn't that the usual principle for <I>first-order</I> knowledge? To know it's a zebra, you have to rule out the relevant alternatives: that it is a giraffe, etc. Being a "cleverly disguised mule", though an alternative, is not in ordinary conditions considered to be a <I>relevant</I> alternative. So that's how you can know it's a zebra, even though you can't rule out this fancy alternative.<BR/><BR/>Perhaps you mean to suggest that once we ascend to higher-order knowledge, a wider range of alternatives become "relevant". That's an interesting idea. Puzzling, though. Do you have any suggestions <I>why</I> that should be the case?<BR/><BR/>[Aside: Let R be the proposition that I know that P. It would be strange if the principles governing knowledge of R were wildly different from the principles governing knowledge of P. We should want to give a unified account of knowledge, which applies to knowledge of mental states in much the same way as it applies to knowledge of external facts.]<BR/><BR/>Here's a suggestion: a relevant alternative to <I>my knowing that P</I> is <I>my justifiably yet falsely believing that P</I>. In order to rule out this latter alternative, we need (descending now to the first level) to do more than just rule out ordinary alternative to P (e.g. giraffes). I must also rule out the more distant alternatives that would falsify P whilst leaving it justifiable to believe in (e.g. cleverly disguised mules). What do you think?<BR/><BR/>P.S. I think contextualism handles closure nicely. But I should post about this on my own blog.Richardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16725218276285291235noreply@blogger.com